> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.openetf.xyz/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.openetf.xyz/economics/redemption.md).

# How redemptions are funded

**A redemption has one price: the NAV at the first eligible pricing event after its cash is in place. Idle cash pays first, every redemption trims the portfolio in proportion so that, absent other flows, the holders who remain keep its leverage and mix, waiting requests share arriving cash pro rata, and an exit adjustment fee stays in the pool.**

What a holder sees and signs is on [Redeeming](https://docs.openetf.xyz/investing/redeem.md); this page covers how the cash is raised and shared.

## Three steps raise cash; none sets a different price

1. **Idle cash pays first.** Confirmed available cash fixes the portion it covers, net of the exit adjustment fee. Those shares burn, and the payment is fixed with its own backing.
2. **Every redemption trims in proportion.** Whether or not idle cash covered it, each redemption trims every perpetual position and every non-USDC spot holding by the request's share of the fund, without flipping direction. Absent other flows, the remaining holders keep the same portfolio at the same leverage. A redemption that follows a subscription still trims positions, because new shares own a slice of every position from the moment they are minted. Proceeds return to the pool and fix the rest of the request.
3. **Three deviations only.**
   * Where a margin domain still cannot release the cash after its proportional trim, the system first cancels that domain's orders that use margin, then trims it further, as far as the exchange requires.
   * A position whose trim falls below the minimum order size is skipped and covered from idle cash, or rounded up when cash is short; the extra cash stays in the pool.
   * If prices move and the trim still leaves a request short with no cash in the pool, the fund trims every position again in proportion to the shortfall until the request is covered.

Paying only from cash, or selling only what the exchange requires, would push the remaining holders' leverage toward the protocol limit: a 3× fund that pays half its shares from idle cash would be left at 6×. The exit adjustment fee offsets part of the trading cost of proportional trims. At higher leverage, in thin markets, for large redemptions or for spot holdings, which the rate does not count, the fee may not cover the actual cost, and the remaining holders bear the difference.

Trims are reduce-only immediate-or-cancel limit orders, placed in rounds under public execution parameters that are the same for every ETF and that the Manager cannot change. Each round is sized from a snapshot of the fund's positions and uses the parameters in force at that snapshot, whichever requests it serves; a request does not keep the parameters in force when it was accepted. A change is announced at least a published notice period ahead and takes effect for every ETF at the announced time. The ETF page and the Passport show the current values, the notice period and any announced change. Nobody chooses which asset to sell or what price a holder gets.

A position that keeps failing to fill is recorded as blocked, with its actual exposure disclosed. The part of a request that depends on it, measured approximately by that position's share of the request's trim notional, keeps waiting with the reason recorded; proceeds from other positions are priced as usual.

A market whose issuer has stopped pushing prices is treated as blocked from the moment the stop is observed: the system places no orders in it, so the part of a request that depends on it waits. When idle cash has already paid a request, that position is not trimmed and the remaining holders' share of the market rises. When the issuer resumes, trimming continues; when the market settles, the fund no longer holds it or its domain is isolated, the waiting part prices at the NAV then in force.

While requests wait, the Manager's risk-increasing orders first set aside the cash those requests need ([Trading an ETF](https://docs.openetf.xyz/managing/trading.md)).

## Waiting shares keep their full exposure until priced

A waiting request is not carved out into its own positions. Its shares stay in the pool and bear the same gains, losses and fees as every other share, so the holder receives the NAV when cash arrives, not at submission.

Exchange fees and slippage from redemption sales reduce pool value once, borne by all shares outstanding at pricing, waiting shares included. The payment carries no second deduction, and system orders pay no platform trading fee.

## Arriving cash is shared in proportion to waiting shares

A waiting request is priced at the first eligible pricing event after its cash is in place: the first block in which valid valuation and execution conditions both hold. The platform cannot pick that block. Each pricing event sets its NAV, its leverage reading and one allocation ratio at its start. Each request's exit adjustment fee rate applies the fee formula in force when that request was accepted to this leverage reading, so after a formula change, requests accepted before and after it can pay different rates in the same event. Every executable waiting request is fixed at the same NAV and allocation ratio, even when the results are written across several transactions. A blocked request receives nothing and has nothing reserved.

Every executable waiting request is fixed in every event, however small its slice; the minimum payout amount only decides when an automatic payment is sent ([Redeeming](https://docs.openetf.xyz/investing/redeem.md#waiting-requests-share-arriving-cash-in-proportion-to-their-shares)). Among waiting requests, the order of arrival does not change what each receives. A new request can use idle cash immediately, but only what the queue leaves over; its remainder waits for sales and carries market risk meanwhile.

## The exit adjustment fee stays with the holders who remain

Every priced portion pays the exit adjustment fee on its value at pricing, whether idle cash or later cash covers it. The rate rises with the fund's notional leverage up to a cap ([Fees and costs](https://docs.openetf.xyz/economics/fees.md#the-exit-adjustment-fee-rate-follows-leverage)). Leverage comes from the same read as NAV. A HIP-3 domain whose position notional is not yet read into pricing is estimated as its equity times its public maximum leverage. The estimate can be higher or lower than the actual notional: it runs high for positions opened below maximum leverage and can run low for positions near liquidation. Where such a domain holds much of the fund, the estimate can put the rate well above what actual leverage implies, up to the 1% cap. Isolated domains are excluded ([Formulas](https://docs.openetf.xyz/reference/formulas.md#the-exit-adjustment-fee-follows-leverage)).

{% hint style="info" %}
No one collects the exit adjustment fee. It issues no shares and goes to neither the platform nor the Manager; it stays in the pool and raises NAV for every remaining share, the Manager's included.
{% endhint %}

Idle cash is a buffer all holders share: a holder paid from it gets the NAV before the trim made for that redemption, while the trim's costs fall on the shares still in the pool, and the fee stays in the pool to offset that cost. The rate rises with leverage because a margin withdrawal can leave no less than the larger of initial margin and 10% of notional. OpenETF applies that limit to each margin domain, so when a domain is above 10× notional leverage, any redemption first brings it back below 10×, a cost no rate fully covers and all shares at pricing bear.

Above the cost basis the fee raises the accrued performance fee, so the Manager receives *r* times the fee indirectly. A pricing that burns every remaining share, and Wind-down distributions, carry no fee.

## The Manager's own redemption is capped

A Manager's request is capped by the commitment ratio; the part over the cap waits unpriced and uncharged ([Manager Capital](https://docs.openetf.xyz/managing/capital.md#redemptions-and-transfers-have-different-ceilings)).

## Interruptions change the path, never a fixed amount

Moving, paying or claiming a fixed amount never changes it. How a valuation pause, Wind-down or dead-market isolation affects a waiting request is set out in [Redeeming](https://docs.openetf.xyz/investing/redeem.md#pauses-wind-down-and-dead-markets-change-the-path-not-the-rights). Until a stopped market is determined dead, redemptions price on readings that include its domain, so a reading pushed in the fund's favor can overpay an exiting holder ([Supported Markets](https://docs.openetf.xyz/how-it-works/risk-controls/supported-markets.md#a-stopped-issuer-feed-freezes-the-market-and-closes-new-subscriptions)). On testnet, where dead-market determination is not yet enabled, this lasts until the issuer resumes, the market settles or the fund no longer holds the market. No price-based circuit breaker applies, and pricing pauses only when the books cannot be reconciled ([Pauses and surviving rights](https://docs.openetf.xyz/risks-and-security/interruptions.md)).

In fund-industry terms, the queue is a cash-limited redemption gate, the fee an anti-dilution levy, and isolation a side pocket, though one that can hold open, leveraged positions. Rule-based exits stand behind the [three layers of risk control](https://docs.openetf.xyz/how-it-works/risk-controls.md).

Next: [Pricing and valuation](https://docs.openetf.xyz/economics/pricing.md)
